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Getting across the bird flu issues
Mediawatch: With stories about bird flu and its possible ability to infect
humans appearing with unrelenting regularity, Bernard Dixon looks at a
BBC television programme aiming to put the subject into context, which
was transmitted earlier this month.What degrees of anxiety, fear or
panic are appropriate in face of a
pandemic of ‘bird flu’? How well
prepared is any one country to
cope with a highly virulent, highly
communicable influenza virus?
BBC Television’s Panorama
tackled these questions facing
Britain earlier this month, and for
the most part succeeded well in
presenting what the BBC called a
measured account of the
situation. Despite its plaintive
conclusion (“We can only hope it
doesn’t happen this winter”), and
some unfortunate omissions, the
programme offered prudent
proportions of concern and
reassurance.
With reminders of the
appearance of avian flu in Hong
Kong eight years ago and its later
re-emergence in China, the film
focused on Vietnam, home of 41
of the 62 humans worldwide who
have already died following
infection with the H5N1 strain.
Jeremy Farrar, a British specialist
working in Ho Chi Minh City,showed that the likely source of
the organism was droplets
breathed in by people butchering
chickens and ducks.
There and in Cambodia,
Thailand and Indonesia, “where
people live cheek by jowl with
their poultry”, there have been a
total of 122 confirmed cases over
the past three years. The human
dimension of the story was
graphically illustrated through an
interview with a Vietnamese
woman whose husband died after
contracting the disease from an
infected cockerel. A chest X-ray
showed that the virus had totally
destroyed his lung tissue.
The key issue, explained very
clearly, was the risk of the H5N1
virus mutating or recombining so
that it becomes transmissible not
only from birds to humans but
also between humans. The UK
Chief Medical Officer, Liam
Donaldson, said that, although a
million or so people had probably
been exposed so far, the
organism had not shown anysigns of mutating into a human
strain or hybridising with human
influenza virus.
Describing himself as an
optimist, Jeremy Farrar
nevertheless pointed out the
difficulty of interpreting the
clusters of human cases seen in
the Far East. While these
appeared to represent individual
infections acquired from birds,
there remained a possibility that
relatively inefficient transmission
between people had already
occurred. Farrar also argued that
the high fatality rate recorded so
far does bring benefits in
reducing the overall risk of other
individuals becoming infected.
Conversely, a virus with lower
lethality would mean greater
dissemination.
The weakest part of the
programme was that dealing with
preparations for dealing with the
threat. Firstly, viewers were told
that the UK will have 2.5m doses
of a vaccine against the H5N1
virus ready by next spring — but
that it will “almost certainly not be
suitable”. Secondly, we were
assured that the country would
need 120m doses of a vaccine
specifically targeted against a newCheek by fowl: The close association between people and their poultry in Southeast Asia is a continuing concern in the face of the
current outbreak of the H5N1 flu strain causing worries about its possible transmission to humans. (Photograph: EMPICS.) 
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China’s agriculture ministry has
been announcing bird flu
outbreaks within the country with
grim regularity in recent weeks,
and there is growing concern that
the country may be source of the
greatly feared mutated or hybrid
virus that could trigger a human
flu pandemic.
In its latest efforts to manage the
crisis, the government has insisted
that Beijing knows of any outbreak
within three hours of the detection
of suspected cases. The new
timing is part of a contigency plan
hammered out by the Ministry of
Agriculture to counter the spread
of potential fatal bird flu outbreaks
this autumn and winter.
According to reports in the
China Daily earlier this month, an
outbreak must be reported to
provincial authorities within two
hours of first observation and,
after confirmation, the provincial
veterinary bureau must report to
the ministry within an hour.
Anyone can report an outbreak
to a veterinary bureau, and inform
authorities about any misconduct
by a department or person in
disease prevention, the
government said.
The north-east province of
Liaoning is reported as China’s
worst bird-flu affected area. A
woman poultry farmer was tested
for bird-flu infection but the
government’s Xinhua news
agency said that initial tests for
bird flu were negative and the
woman was suffering from
“serious pneumonia”.
But jitters remain even though
bird flu had also been ruled out in
120 other people who were being
monitored in Liaoning’s Heishan
county. The World Health
Organisation is helping China to
investigate possible human
infection during an outbreak in the
central province of Hunan. China
admitted that three people in
Hunan who were diagnosed with
pneumonia had all handled
chickens that died from the H5N1
strain of virus.
Grip tightens on
virus outbreaks
The Chinese government is
increasing its control of the bird
flu outbreaks in the country. Nigel
Williams reports.variant, freely transmissible
between people. Because
production in hens’ eggs is slow,
six months’ work would be
required to manufacture two shots
for everybody.
UK expert John Oxford argued
that, instead of waiting for the
crucial genetic shift, the UK
government should order H5N1
vaccine for the entire population
now. It was, he said, better to
have something than nothing.
Immunisation with the existing
product would “have some
effect”. There was also reference
to trials of an H5N1 vaccine in
ducks in Vietnam, coupled with a
warning that no-one knew
whether or not this would be
effective.
Missing from this segment of
the programme was an
explanation of the crucial
technical challenge in the
development of a vaccine against
any infection — that of identifying
the antigens in a microorganism
that can provoke the formation of
protective antibodies. Elementary
graphics could have illustrated
this point and the key differences
between H5N1, earlier viruses and
a putative pandemic strain in
future.
There were mixed voices
regarding access to the antiviral
drug Tamiflu (oseltamivir). While
the British government has
ordered 6m doses, which will be
available by September 2006 and
will (according to Donaldson) be
given to health workers and other
essential staff, there were also
suggestions that privileged or
determined individuals such as
politicians had secreted away
personal supplies. Oxford
admitted to having a small
quantity, half of which he had
already given away, but warned of
the possibility of a “New Orleans
situation” if a known treatment
was scarce. Farrar said that he
had not acquired any — despite
working in the front-line.
Another weakness in this
edition of Panorama was the lack
of any clear indication of the age
group(s) most likely to be
threatened by avian flu, and thus
of those likely to be prioritised for
Tamiflu or immunisation. Oxford
pointed out that the 1918pandemic affected mainly young
adults “because they had little
immunity”. Yet most of the recent
victims in Vietnam have been
young adults, rather than older or
younger people. There was no
reference to computer modelling
studies whose results have
implied that vaccination should be
directed not towards the elderly
and those with chronic chest or
heart problems, but towards
schoolchildren, because they
have the greatest potential for
spreading the disease.
Oxford University
epidemiologist Angela McLean
said that she will “send her
children to the country to protect
them against the first wave of an
epidemic”. She argued that the
initial wave, lasting perhaps three
months, would be the worst,
partly because control measures
would be more effective later.
Government plans assume that
14.5m people will be ill during the
first wave, with a peak of 20,000
hospital admissions per week.The assumption is that
approximately 50,000 people will
die, many of them under 65.
Altogether a worrisome
scenario. There were, however,
some needlessly scary moments.
Farrar’s assertion that “we don’t
know how to prevent ourselves
getting it” was too strong, when
his real intention was to remind us
that people can be infectious
before they show any symptoms. 
But what of the simple, easily
avoidable ways in which we
contract respiratory infections?
How about grasping public door
handles, which will be heaving
with virus particles in any flu
epidemic? What of rubbing our
noses? Not even hinted at on the
programme, there are many
pointers of this sort that could
make a considerable difference to
our chances of acquiring H5N1 or
its descendent when it arrives.
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